Joe was an invited speaker at a conference in Kuwait sponsored by the United Nations Development Program – Regional Workshop: Building Capacities and Promoting Collective Action to Strengthen Private Sector Integrity, Dec. 18-19, 2012, Kuwait City, Kuwait.

Participants in the conference represented 20 Arab nations; the focus was on practical steps to prevent corruption, working with the private sector.

Joe spoke on “International Frameworks and Emerging Global Trends on Private Sector Integrity: Reaching Small and Medium Enterprises.” He emphasized the important role governments play in promoting anti-corruption compliance and ethics programs, the need to encourage effective programs, and how governments can use their leverage to increase buy-in by small and medium-sized enterprises.

 

The Antitrust and Competition Law Compliance Forum announces its new web site, at http://www.compliance-network.com As noted on the site, this Forum is a discussion group focused on antitrust and competition law compliance programs.

“We are a non-profit network of individuals dedicated to the global advancement of highly effective anti-cartel compliance programs, as a means to prevent and detect cartel behavior. Our members, from various backgrounds and geographic locations, have come together to form an online resource hub for this area of study.”

Our mission includes the role of government in promoting effective anti-cartel programs. On the site we provide a broad range of resources that address how governments take steps to promote programs, and also how some governments have undercut such programs.

Ted Banks, Donna Boehme and Joe are organizers of this Forum.

 

 

Ted Banks and Joe recently published an article titled: “The International Law of Antitrust Compliance,” 40 Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 368 (2012), also available in “Perspectives on International Law in an Era of Change” (Nanda & Mundt, eds.).  This article looks at the development of antitrust compliance programs, and calls for a change in the negative policies of the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice and the European Commission, which undercut the development of more effective company programs. The article concludes:

 

“If the governments of the world expect to treat competition law as a basic tenet of international law, governing, as it does, the conduct of local and multinational corporations, then they must also recognize the need to accord competition law compliance programs their proper role in determining enforcement priorities and penalties.”

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The FTC and antitrust compliance programs

On August 15, 2012, in In the News, by Joe Murphy

As published in the July/August issue of Compliance and Ethics Professional:

Read the article

 

The Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics (www.corporatecompliance.org ) recently released the results of an important survey of company antitrust compliance practices (http://www.corporatecompliance.org/Resources/View/ArticleId/227/Antitrust-Compliance-How-Does-the-Government-Impact-Your-Program.aspx ). Called “Antitrust: A Dangerous but Underappreciated Compliance Issue,” the survey reports on some of the compliance steps used by companies, and the impact of governmental approaches to compliance programs. While in other areas of enforcement the Department of Justice takes compliance programs into account, the Antitrust Division stands out in not considering programs, and showing seeming disdain for the subject. DG Comp in Europe also gives no credit for programs, no matter how diligent.

One finding of the survey is particularly striking and reveals fundamental weakness in the approach to antirust compliance.

“An astounding 64% do not report performing the types of antitrust compliance audits that would meet the minimum standards under the Sentencing Guidelines.”

Also noteworthy was the report on companies’ views on the government’s approach to compliance.

“Detailed advice on steps to include in compliance programs, taking compliance programs into account when deciding whether to take enforcement actions, and offering penalty reductions to companies that have compliance programs were all given high ratings for value by survey respondents—77% for advice and 88% for some form of incentives.”

In other words, the result of the Antitrust Division’s and DG Comp’s lack of interest in compliance programs is entirely predictable: “if the government doesn’t care, why should we?” If the government did consider programs as a positive factor and did provide advice on what elements were important, the survey makes it clear that this would get results.

 

The January/February 2012 issue of ethikos include Joe’s article, “The EU Takes a Tentative First Step Toward Compliance Programs.” Joe notes that the European Commission has at least done more than the US Antitrust Division in offering a guidance document on compliance programs, but notes that the Commission fails to back this up with any meaningful recognition of such programs. There is much more that the EC can and should do, if it wants to be serious in promoting compliance programs. As Joe notes, “Getting companies to join the fight against cartels is too important to accept mere rhetoric, totally unsupported by meaningful action.”

 
Joe and Donna Boehme have posted this article on the Social Science Research Network.  It is a response to an article by Professor Andreas Stephan questioning whether antitrust compliance programs are effective in dealing with cartels.  Joe and Donna explain why antitrust programs can work for this purpose, but are seriously undercut by the negative approaches of the US Antitrust Division and the European Commission.  Murphy & Boehme, “Fear No Evil: A Compliance and Ethics Professionals’ Response To Dr. Stephan,” http://ssrn.com/abstract=1965733

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Joe was retained by the OECD Competition Committee to create a white paper for use in the multinational meeting held in Paris on June 29, 2011.  The paper, titled “Promoting Compliance with Competition Law: Do Compliance Programs Have a Role to Play,” examines the role compliance programs could play in the global fight against cartels, and lays out a route for governments to achieve this objective.  The report can be found on the OECD’s web site, at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/13/48849071.pdf .

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The “Fast Rat” Program

On November 8, 2011, in In the News, by Joe Murphy

On Monday, October 31, 2011, Joe published a comment on the Antitrust and Competition Policy blog, hosted by the distinguished professor and antitrust expert, Daniel Sokol. The post is a parody of the US Antitrust Division’s negative approach to compliance programs.  For a different perspective on the Division’s announced indifference to compliance programs and its reliance on its leniency program, read all about the newest development, the “FAST RAT” program, offered by The Devil’s Advocate, LLC. Here is the link to the blog:

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/

 

One of the key messages of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, beginning in 1991, was that government should recognize and encourage company compliance and ethics programs.  The Guidelines do this through the carrot and stick approach.  The SEC does this, including through its recent efforts to address concerns about whistleblowers undermining corporate compliance efforts.  The US Supreme Court, in cases involving discrimination, has recognized the importance of compliance efforts, providing that they may be a defense to certain harassment claims, and a defense to punitive damages in discrimination cases.  The Department of Justice Criminal Division does this in taking programs into account in decisions to prosecute.  The US Attorney’s Manual instructs federal prosecutors to take programs into account (with one exception).   So can we tell our clients that programs matter to the government?

Unfortunately, one pocket of the Department of Justice has carved out an exception for itself.  It offers no credit for any compliance program, ever.  No company has ever received a sentence reduction for programs in this one area;  in fact, the Sentencing Guidelines have an odd carve-out just for this one area.  Even when a company admits it has committed the most serious types of criminal violations in this area, it is neither expected to have a program nor to institute one.  This enforcement body rewards any company that beats its fellow criminals to the government’s door in disclosing a violation, but will not give any company any credit for a program under any circumstances.  This one group of enforcers has even carved out the only exception in the US Attorneys Manual; it, alone in the Department of Justice, may ignore compliance programs with impunity. This one group is the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice.

Of course, we can all tell our clients there are many good reasons for companies to have compliance programs, and this is certainly true.  But why should there be two opposite policies in the same government?  Why is it good for the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division to promote and recognize effective programs, and yet have a sister Division do exactly the opposite?  Either it is good public policy to promote corporate self-policing, or it is not.  Let’s have one message from the government that makes sense in this important area.